Technical Program

Paper Detail

Paper Title Proving Erasure
Paper IdentifierTU1.R8.4
Authors Xavier Coiteux-Roy, Stefan Wolf, Università della Svizzera italiana, Switzerland
Session Codes for Privacy and Wiretap Channels
Location Conseil, Level 5
Session Time Tuesday, 09 July, 09:50 - 11:10
Presentation Time Tuesday, 09 July, 10:50 - 11:10
Manuscript  Click here to download the manuscript
Abstract It seems impossible to certify that a remote hosting service does not leak its users' data --- or does quantum mechanics make it possible? We investigate if a server hosting data can information-theoretically prove its definite deletion using a BB84-like protocol. To do so, we first rigorously introduce an alternative to privacy by encryption: privacy-delegation. We then apply this novel concept to provable deletion and remote data storage. For both tasks, we present a protocol, show its partial security, and display its vulnerability to eavesdropping attacks targetting only a few bits.