Technical Program

Paper Detail

Paper Title On the Number of Bins in Equilibria for Signaling Games
Paper IdentifierTU2.R7.4
Authors Serkan Sarıtaş, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden; Philippe Furrer, Oliver Wyman Incorporated, Canada; Sinan Gezici, Bilkent University, Turkey; Tamás Linder, Serdar Yüksel, Queen's University, Canada
Session Game Theory
Location Bièvre, Level 5
Session Time Tuesday, 09 July, 11:40 - 13:00
Presentation Time Tuesday, 09 July, 12:40 - 13:00
Manuscript  Click here to download the manuscript
Abstract We investigate the equilibrium behavior for the decentralized quadratic cheap talk problem in which an encoder and a decoder, viewed as two decision makers, have misaligned objective functions. In prior work, we have shown that the number of bins under any equilibrium has to be at most countable, generalizing a classical result due to Crawford and Sobel who considered sources with density supported on [0,1]. In this paper, we refine this result in the context of exponential and Gaussian sources. For exponential sources, a relation between the upper bound on the number of bins and the misalignment in the objective functions is derived, the equilibrium costs are compared, and it is shown that there also exist equilibria with infinitely many bins under certain parametric assumptions. For Gaussian sources, it is shown that there exist equilibria with infinitely many bins.